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Only the road and the dawn, the sun, the wind, and the rain,
And the watchﬁre under the stars, and sleep, and the road again.
—John Maseﬁeld (1878–1967), “The Seekers” (1923:52–53)

Abstract
The radical subjectivism of the Austrian school of economics is a special case of
Dewey’s ways of knowing. Austrian economists adopted an Aristotelian deductive
approach to economic issues such as social behavior and exchange. In Dewey’s
contrasting view, the scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing to the
scientiﬁc community, offering more profound insight or more efﬁcacious practical
applications. Alternative ways of knowing which do not offer practical or intellectual
beneﬁts are to be rejected. Dewey’s transactional strategy, asserting knowledge as
ways of knowing, suggests a broader and more fundamental critique of the socialist
position in the calculation debate. The arguments presented by the Austrian school
can be reformulated in terms of Dewey’s transactional philosophy.

Introduction
John Dewey’s most distinctive philosophical doctrine is the substitution of “inquiry” for “truth” (Dewey and Bentley 1949:196). Intellectual activity focuses not
on the outcome but on the process of constructing “warranted assertions.”1 As with
Maseﬁeld’s “seekers,” the journey is as important as the destination (Dewey 1938c);
in transactional philosophy, the means and hypothesized end are equally important
and co-deﬁning aspects within inquiry.2 Dewey criticizes the traditional, ontologic
notion of truth in which each item of knowledge is immutable, perfect, and ﬁnal
(Dewey and Bentley 1949:189). In contrast, Dewey views thought as an evolutionary process (Russell 1945:772), a view known as pragmatism or instrumentalism
(Blanshard 1962:31). The idea of truth embodied in the scientiﬁc method, that
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all explanations are tentative (Dewey 1925:9), seems to be one of Dewey’s starting points (Handy and Harwood 1973:11–20). Most scientists and philosophers,
however, believe in an ultimate ﬁxed destination for human inquiry—an ontologic absolute.
Dewey goes beyond them in rigor, if not always in formalism, because he acknowledges we cannot be sure about the ﬁnality of any truth we aim to uncover.
Until we can establish that ontological truth does exist—a rather tall order as long
as we remain fundamentally ignorant of its content—we are not entitled to assume
its existence, or for that matter that it may have any particular content. Dewey
emphasizes further that the meaning of knowledge is context-dependent (Dewey
and Bentley 1949:137). Dewey prefers the expression “belief” to “knowledge,” to
emphasize its tentative nature. He also recommends the expression “warranted assertion” in place of “truth” (Dewey 1938b:7, Dewey and Bentley 1949:165) to divest
the subjects of inquiry of their purportedly ontologic character.
Dewey’s philosophy can be applied in the social sciences, and particularly in
economics, to clear methodological roadblocks and deepen our understanding of
economic reality. As suggested above, this appeal to Deweyan transactional strategy
should be viewed as an appeal to higher rigor, rather than a retreat from rigorous
reasoning. This paper will discuss the applicability of Dewey’s approach to several
areas of economics of particular interest to the Austrian school. The paper is organized as follows: following this brief introduction, Dewey’s philosophy is outlined
in part 2, “Dewey’s Pragmatism and the Transactional Strategy;” next, the transactional view is applied to two important problems in modern economic theory in
part 3, “The Subject-Object Distinction in Economics” and part 4, “Entrepreneurship and Equilibria;” followed ﬁnally by part 5, the “Conclusion.”

Dewey’s Pragmatism and the Transactional Strategy
Dewey’s philosophical methodology, the transactional strategy or transactional
view, aims at breaking down problematical dualisms (Dewey 1938a:5).3 Examples
of problematic dualisms reconceptualized with the transactional strategy include
mind versus body, organism versus environment, stimulus versus response, subject
versus object, meaning versus context, etc. In Dewey’s view, the strict ontological
separation implied by these rigidly dichotomous pairings can be highly misleading. With the example of mind and body, it remains unclear where one stops and
the other begins. Generally, one cannot exist or be deﬁned or imagined without
the other—there can be no organism in the absence of an environment, and no
environment in the absence of organisms, no subject without an object and vice
versa, and so on (Palmer 2004; 2005:11–13).
Palmer (2005) uses the phrase “transactional strategy” to describe Dewey’s
approach to problematical dualisms, separations, or oppositions. The transactional strategy consists of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the purported ontological
separations are reinterpreted as functional distinctions, which are always tentative
and often arbitrary (Dewey 1925:9). Functional distinctions are better viewed as
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inherently tentative rather than absolute and ontological; however, they can retain tremendous power and practical efﬁcacy as functional distinctions with the
status of working conjectures. The tentative nature of arbitrary deﬁnitions or distinctions was, in practice, often substituted with a permanent and absolute, neoPlatonic essence.
The second phase of the transactional strategy attempts to frame a reconciliation4 of the former ontologically distinct dualism by envisioning the two sides of
each functional distinction as aspects of a more inclusive, encompassing whole, a
transaction. Transactions recognize that the two parts are not really separate, usually because one cannot exist or even be deﬁned without reference to the other, and
that the functional distinction is an arbitrary one made for our convenience. In
other words, a functional distinction is problem-driven—it is deﬁned in relation to
what we are trying to achieve within a given inquiry. Among the functional distinctions Dewey reconciled within transactions were (a) body and mind within action,
(b) organism and environment within life-activity, (c) stimulus and response within
coordination, and (d) designation and existence within fact (Palmer 2005).
In Dewey’s view, it is a mistake to treat conceptual distinctions, separations,
divisions, dualisms, dichotomies, etc., as something ontological, observer-independent, and existing prior to observation—which is not to say that conceptual
distinctions are not real in other senses, for example, as assertions warranted on
the basis of past inquiries. Conceptual distinctions are only subjective,5 not ontological; that is, they can never be ﬁnally and necessarily real or universal, or can
never be ﬁnally demonstrated as real, universal, and ontologically absolute.6 Palmer
(2005:2–3) suggests “a distinction is a difference noted, [but] an ontological separation is a division assumed to have been there all along.” There is no way for us
to be objectively certain that differences we note have, in fact, been there all along,
for in so doing we must note observed differences, and thus involve ourselves. We
can quite legitimately, however, claim any difference we note as subjective knowledge, a distinction we construct for our own convenience. Economics, however,
offers a rigorous approach to analyzing the problems of subjective knowledge and
preference, much like statistics offers a rigorous approach to analyzing the problems of uncertainty.
Palmer further notes that distinctions are a broader category than separations (Figure 1). A separation presupposes a distinction, but a distinction does not
necessarily presuppose a separation. A separation is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a distinction, but a distinction is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient condition for a separation—things are often distinct without being separate. As long
as we consider a distinction to be an ontological separation, human understanding is constrained by any limits the separation imposes. The difﬁculty lies in the
fact that not all distinctions are necessarily separations. Viewing the separation as
a tentative working distinction liberates us from this particular limitation (Dewey
1925:9). Working distinctions can be modiﬁed or abandoned as needed whenever
they fail the practical test of utility.
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labor unions, governments, government agencies, etc., are the subjects which construct and revise entrepreneurial plans, conferring value on physical objects.7 The
subject-object dichotomy is alive and well in modern economics, and seems to be
as indispensable as it is central to the discipline. Goods possess value not because it
is an objective, physical, or intrinsic property of the goods themselves, but because
of judgments and expectations which differ from person to person and for the same
person at different times (Mises 1960:93–97; compare with Dewey 1925:319–328).
The objects and their physical characteristics are not thought to have any economic
signiﬁcance apart from the subjective valuation and expectations of the subjects.
The subject confers value and meaning on objects of economic activity, planning,
and exchange. Meaning resides in individuals but evolves socially through interaction among individuals. The most familiar medium of this interaction is communication, but economics deals more particularly with the social interaction of
exchanges of one good for another.
Subject and object are both broad concepts in economics. Since knowledge
is inherently subjective—it must be known by someone—it may be better to view
knowledge according to Hayek’s (1945) distinction between knowledge, which is
subjective and personal, and information, which is universal and objective but also
much less important.
Economic subjectivists criticize mainstream economics for ignoring issues
of purpose, intentionality and meaning (Weber 1921; Lachmann 1971; Kirzner
1992, 2000; Lavoie 1991). If economic actors extract meaning from prices, market efﬁciency calls for minimizing the false signals, noise, or entropy contained in
price series. In an environment of spontaneously evolved rules and institutions,
the outcome of a conﬂict should be well understood in advance, and the information can be characterized as I = 1 – Σ pi ln pi (Wiener 1948; Shannon and Weaver
1949; Ashby 1956:174–176), where each possible outcome i has a probability of occurrence of pi. The less the uncertainty, the fewer outcomes are possible, the fewer
the probabilities being summed, and the more concentrated the probability density
function, that is, the lower the uncertainty surrounding the outcome. Further, the
stronger the consensus about the society’s rules, the greater individuals’ subjective
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prior probability assessments will accord. This will be in societies where the institutional conditions for entrepreneurship are best satisﬁed (Harper 1998, 2003),
though entrepreneurs can also beneﬁt by having prior assessments which differ
from the mainstream (Casson 1987, 1995).
If mathematical formalism could solve real-world problems, economists
could go far beyond Debreu (1959) in applying rigorous techniques (Gödel 1931;
Nagel and Newman 1958; Gellert et al. 1975). Instead, mainstream economics simultaneously gloriﬁes empiricism and axiomatization: “. . . economics has become
more and more formal, more and more instrumental, and more and more precise
about areas that are of less and less importance to anybody” (Boettke, Lavoie, and
Storr 2004:3). In addition mainstream economics has long ceased to be empirical
in any sense which can have practical relevance or can meaningfully inform public policy (Boettke, Lavoie, and Storr 2004:20; see also Hutt 1936; Philbrook 1953;
Coase 1975; Klein 1999).
To Dewey, meaning resides in individuals but evolves primarily through
interaction among individuals, a fundamentally cultural activity.8 But economics
emphasizes the individual subjective decision. The transactional strategy attempts
to resolve contradictions introduced by viewing the subject-object distinction as an
ontological absolute, by (a) viewing the separation as a tentative working distinction
(Dewey 1925:9) and (b) attempting to describe this distinction within an encompassing concept which includes both parts and their connection or relationship (Dewey
1938a:5; Dewey and Bentley 1949:136).9 In the context of economics, subject and
object are related within want satisfaction, a concept comprising both subjective
valuation and objective exchange.10 Objects have economic signiﬁcance only when
they can satisfy the subjective wants of economic actors. Thus, given the limited,
technical use of the term “subjectivity” by economists (Lavoie 1991; O’Neill 2000),
Austrian radical subjectivism is a special case of Dewey’s ways of knowing.
Menger (1871, 1883) adopted an Aristotelian deductive approach to the economic issues of social behavior and exchange. Lachmann (1994:246) describes the
evolution of the Austrian school from a ﬁrst-stage value subjectivism of consumer
wants to an increasingly radical second-stage subjectivism of means and ends. Mises
(1949:21) takes the subjectivity of value as given, and concludes economics can only
address the appropriateness of various means for attaining given, subjective ends.11
Mises and Hayek viewed scientiﬁc knowledge, even in the social sciences, as asserting and aiming for objective certainty which they viewed as ﬁnal and ontological.
Hayek’s view of scientiﬁc knowledge presented in The Sensory Order (1952a) and
The Counterrevolution of Science (1952b)12 was closer to that of the logical positivists of the Vienna circle (Schlick 1918; Carnap 1928; Nagle and Newman 1958)
than to Dewey. Hayek’s critique of scientiﬁc positivism in The Counterrevolution
of Science rejected the applicability to the social sciences of the empiricism of the
natural sciences.
Dewey clearly appreciated this perspective: “The attempt to secure unity by
deﬁning the terms of all the sciences in terms of some one science is doomed in adVolume 22(2)
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vance to defeat. In the house which science might build there are many mansions”
(Dewey 1938c:34). Econometrics and other forms of empirical statistical analysis
applied in economics fail to address the everyday experience of economic agents
or even policy makers. Dewey’s claim that “The things of ordinary experience do
not get enlargement and enrichment of meaning as experience” (1925:8) perfectly
describes most of the shortcomings of modern empirical economics (Klein 1999).
Although Hayek was not a positivist in the sense ascribed to Friedman (1953),
Hayek’s belief in the ontologic character of economic knowledge, which he shared
with Mises and Menger, also shares the aim for rigorous certitude which characterized logical positivism.
It is thus somewhat ironic that Hayek rejected logical positivism and most of
the related research program of modern analytical philosophy. It is clear, however,
that his rejection of positivism stemmed from his special appreciation of the misapplications of empirical methods in his own discipline. Mises’s a priorism, asserting
and aiming for apodictic certainty, represented a more extreme form of ontological
objectivism even than Hayek’s. In Dewey’s view, a priori constructs
being reached by methods that seem to those who employ them rationally
mandatory are taken to be “real” in and of themselves—and supremely
real. Then it becomes an insoluble problem why the things of gross, primary experience, should be what they are or indeed why they should be
at all. (Dewey 1925:9)

Among those critical of Mises’s position was Dewey scholar and economist E. C.
Harwood. Harwood’s (1970) review of Mises’s Human Action was dismissive of its
a priori methodology while simultaneously applauding all of Mises’s conclusions.
Mises’s position was similar in this regard to that of non-Austrian axiomatists such
as Debreu (1959), though he joined Hayek in eschewing mathematical formalism.
In Dewey’s view, the scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing
to the scientiﬁc community, offering more profound insight or more efﬁcacious
practical applications (Dewey 1925:9), that is, new solutions to new problems,
and/or better solutions to old problems. “Experimental method . . . is the foe of
every belief that permits habit and wont to dominate invention and discovery, and
ready-made system to override veriﬁable fact. Constant revision is the work of experimental inquiry” (Dewey 1930:156). For Dewey all inquiry is problem-driven,
though scientists are not merely passive recipients of problems, but often exercise
entrepreneurial awareness in deﬁning new ones. Thus, all scientiﬁc knowledge
evolves spontaneously, even when this evolution proceeds through a paradigm shift
or scientiﬁc revolution (Kuhn 1957, 1962).13
Because the subject-object distinction in philosophy—of which the subjectobject distinction in economics is a special case—is one of Dewey’s identiﬁed problematical dualisms which the transactional strategy aims to resolve, the Austrian
school is confronted with a fairly intractable contradiction. According to Hayek
(1945) knowledge is subjective, but the subject-object distinction is only a tentative,
ad hoc construct (Dewey 1925:9).
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The radical subjectivism of the Austrian school leads to the contradictory
conclusion that the market knowledge of entrepreneurial planners, including consumer preferences, is subjective, but the scientiﬁc knowledge of economists is objective, at least provided it is correct. In other words, the knowledge of economics
supposedly has the property that it may be objectively true or false, and purports
to occupy a higher level of understanding than the subjective knowledge of market
participants. Scientiﬁc knowledge asserts an ontological absolute. Dewey’s transactional strategy offers a way out of this seeming contradiction—from a Deweyan
perspective, the “truths” of any scientiﬁc discipline, not only economics, are always tentative, contextual, and subject to further reﬁnement (Dewey 1925), and
thus subjective in precisely the same way as are the preferences and knowledge
of market participants. Scientiﬁc knowledge occupies a higher level of generality
than the market knowledge of entrepreneurial planners, and nearly always offers
deeper understanding, but can neither be considered nor demonstrated to be ontologically superior.14
Both Austrian subjectivism and Dewey’s transactional philosophy justify
rejection of the mirage of social justice (Hayek 1976). A particularly broad and
encompassing way to frame Hayek’s critique of social justice is to formulate it in
terms of Deweyan philosophy. In the Austrian view, our preferences are subjective
and nonadditive across different individuals (Barnett 2003).15 The nonadditivity of
individual preferences results from preferences being subjective in the ﬁrst sense.
Thus, we cannot substitute a hypothesized social preference or welfare function
approximating the average of individual preferences; we can only substitute the
preferences of one idealized individual. In the pursuit of so-called social justice,
one problem is that there is literally nothing to aim for. Two individuals’ preferences cannot be added or averaged because preferences are subjective. In the name
of improving the welfare of all, what Hayek (1976) called the mirage of social justice
serves not real individuals’ preferences, but in the name of scientiﬁc rigor, serves
objective, idealized preferences which belong to nobody. The others who are constrained from pursuing their own happiness are necessarily made worse off. This
criticism is independent of the fact that coercion has to be applied,16 the second
problem with social justice.
Deweyan knowledge as ways of knowing suggests a broader and more fundamental critique of the socialist position in the calculation debate (Stalebrink 2004).
The Austrian school asserted that socialist economic planning, far from being more
scientiﬁc than capitalist market organization, could never approach the effectiveness
of the decentralized planning of the free market. A government planning agency
cannot make use of the amount of information used to set prices through a spontaneously organized market, because markets utilize dispersed information summarized in prices but which cannot otherwise be collected by a central planning
agency. Dewey acknowledged central economic planning as a fact of life, and preferred it be directed through democratic political institutions rather than through
corporations motivated by proﬁt (Dewey 1930:101–120). Corporate-dominated
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planning was too centralized to appeal to Dewey, and through democratic participation, Dewey felt government planning could be sufﬁciently decentralized to avoid
being so oppressive. This position puts him on the opposite side of the calculation
debate from the Austrian school. However, as a non-economist, Dewey probably
would have viewed issues of centralized versus decentralized economic calculation
as narrowly technical with little relevance to his own political views.
Fundamentally, if knowledge cannot be shared across individuals in an absolutely rigorous, ontological sense, like that sought by logical positivism, there
can never be any basis for one individual to impose entrepreneurial planning on
another, whether the planning implements the planner’s preferences or an idealized projection of the hypothesized social mean. Dewey had some sympathy for
mild forms of social planning (Ryan 1995:110–117). His criticisms of capitalism
and corporatism emphasized the need for greater democratic participation to balance the undue power exercised by concentrated wealth. This raises the issue of
whether social progress should be better realized through a spontaneously emergent market order, in which all exchanges (transactions) are voluntary, or through
the instrument of coercively imposed government intervention. The government
which intervenes with force may equally well be a democracy with unlimited majority rule as an unlimited dictatorship.
Hypothetically, one individual might be able to make others better off, if
he could force them to make different choices, but he would have to know their
preferences with absolute certainty. It remains unclear whether we know our own
preferences with the requisite certainty, because choice in real time is always an
experimental process. It also remains unclear why force could be permissible, and
whether the use of force in this context subverts choice to the extent it overrides
any temporal gain in hypothesized utility. Boettke (1993, 1994a, 1994b) notes that
the transition of the formerly planned economies after the collapse of communism
was badly ﬂawed by an effort to dictate the outcome. Mapping out the transition
process implies central planning and precludes the emergence of a spontaneous
order, precisely what was called for to allow these societies to advance.
To summarize, the transactional approach allows economics to clarify its use
of the subject-object distinction. Subjectivism in the social sciences is a technical
approach which emphasizes the subjective bases for human behavior, but clearly
does not deny the reality of objective characteristics or phenomena. Next, we apply the transactional approach to a narrower concepts within economics, the role
of entrepreneurs in maintaining market equilibria.

Entrepreneurship and Equilibria
This section explicates and reconciles three theories of entrepreneurship within the
Austrian tradition,17 those of Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950), Ludwig Lachmann
(1906–1990), and Israel M. Kirzner (1930– ), focusing on the relationship between
entrepreneurial action and market equilibria. The transactional strategy offers the
possibility of formulating a deﬁnitive Austrian theory of the entrepreneur. EquilibE&C ◆ Education and Culture
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rium is a central concept in economic analysis, yet it appears unlikely to ever occur
in reality (Nelson and Winter 1982; Makowski and Ostroy 2001). Thus, equilibrium in economic theory seems to introduce a large number of Deweyan “blocks
to inquiry, blind alleys . . . puzzles rather than problems, solved only by calling
the original material of primary experience, ‘phenomenal,’ mere appearance, mere
impressions, or by some other disparaging name” (Dewey 1925:9). Addressing the
best place of equilibrium and disequilibrium in economic analysis must be done,
and is an imperative cutting across different ideological positions and schools of
economic thought, which “in spite of the diverse subjects to which it applies, and
the consequent diversity of its special techniques [methodology] has a common
structure . . . that is applied both in common sense and science. . . . The controlled
or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements
of the original situation into a uniﬁed whole . . .” (Dewey 1938b:105). Dewey was
not trained in economics, and clearly failed to appreciate the role of entrepreneurial planning in coordinating production (Dewey 1930:134–136), though he did
appreciate the application of applied science in operating industrial production
(Dewey 1938c:30).
In economics, an equilibrium price is one which clears the market for a particular good and equates the quantity supplied with the quantity demanded. Prices
higher than the equilibrium result in surpluses, which impel alert price-setters
to lower the price. Prices lower than the equilibrium result in shortages, impelling price-setters to raise the price. Though markets may never clear perfectly or
completely, there always exists a tendency toward equilibrium if the price-setters
respond to incentives, because when markets clear, sellers earn higher proﬁts, and
buyers attain greater satisfaction compared to when markets fail to clear. Thus the
implied equilibrium toward which entrepreneurs effect adjustment experimentally
emerges with the constellations of prices they try out on the market and the plans
they develop to earn proﬁts through satisfying the wants of others. Lachmann (1947,
1956, 1971, 1976a, 1976b) focused on entrepreneurial contributions to upsetting
existing equilibria to bring about better coordination among the planned production and consumption activities of autonomous yet interdependent individuals. In
contrast, Kirzner (1984a) framed a broader concept of entrepreneurial action by
recognizing that it can be either successful or unsuccessful. Successful entrepreneurship improves the coordination of entrepreneurial plans and is equilibrating;
unsuccessful entrepreneurship is disequilibrating. Entrepreneurial success predominates because it is rewarded by market incentives.18
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs focus on technological change. They move
market prices away from equilibrium by introducing new production technologies, marketing and distribution media, and new plans which increase the social
dispersion of knowledge (Schumpeter 1911:64). For Schumpeter the entrepreneur
seeks to shift the production function and cost function (Trifﬁn 1940:168; Schumpeter 1962:104–105, 132). To Lachmann (1976a, 1976b), entrepreneurship is a much
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broader concept, because Lachmannian entrepreneurs also change market conditions even when they are not introducing new technologies:
. . . the equilibrating forces, operating slowly, especially where much of the
capital equipment is durable and speciﬁc, are always overtaken by unexpected change before they have done their work. . . . What emerges from
our reﬂections is an image of the market as a particular kind of process,
a continuous process without beginning or end, propelled by the interaction between the forces of equilibrium and the forces of change. (Lachmann 1976b:61)

Though a plan may be intended to offer ﬂexibility and be adaptable to changing market conditions, planning always imposes some degree of inﬂexibility by
limiting future choices. In Kirzner’s (1973: 72–73; 1976) view, successful entrepreneurs discover previously unsuspected disequilibria and proﬁt from their removal.19
Kirzner notes that prices remain in equilibrium until alert entrepreneurs discover
information dispersal and asymmetry and act to take advantage of the arbitrage
opportunity. Kirznerian entrepreneurs, when successful, establish a new equilibrium where market participants’ plans are better coordinated and their wants can
be better satisﬁed than before (Kirzner 1984b:160). Kirznerian entrepreneurs proﬁt
through alertness to new opportunities unsuspected by others: “entrepreneurship
for me is not so much the introduction of new products or of new techniques of
production as the ability to see where new products have become unexpectedly
valuable to consumers and where new methods of production have, unknown to
others, become feasible” (Kirzner 1973: 81).
The Schumpeterian and Lachmannian entrepreneurs disturb and destroy the
old equilibrium; the successful Kirznerian entrepreneur moves the market toward a
new one. Kirznerian entrepreneurs avoid risk and cost (Blaug 1998:223) because they
move the market toward a new equilibrium which could only exist hypothetically
after the entrepreneurial action. Kirzner on the one hand, and Schumpeter and Lachmann on the other, offer diametrically opposed views of the role of the entrepreneur
in relation to market equilibria (table 1). The actual dispersion of the asymmetric
information introduced by Schumpeterian and Lachmannian entrepreneurs lessens
the coordination of economic plans. Kirznerian entrepreneurs exercise alertness to
discover these already-existing information asymmetries, and when their plans are
successful, serve to improve the coordination among others’ plans. Figure 2 illustrates
the relationships among the three authors’ concepts of entrepreneurship.
The true market environment in which an entrepreneur operates can only be
discovered through experience, but by then it is too late, because the entrepreneurial plan has already been carried out, and has failed. This ﬁrst kind of knowledge
problem (Kirzner’s Knowledge Problem A), a problem of overoptimism, causes
planned exchanges to be impossible to fulﬁll. Kirzner (1990:169–171) notes overoptimism is self-correcting, as market participants either adjust their plans to the
realities of the market, or withdraw from the market.
It is also possible for entrepreneurs to come to the erroneous conclusions that
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Alternative Theories of Equilibria and Entrepreneurship
Table 1. Alternative Theories of Equilibria and Entrepreneurship
Schumpeter

Lachmann

Kirzner

Market
equilibria

Equilibria are disturbed through technological progress
(1911).
Expectations imply a
certain allocation of
resources. Though
technological change
is disequilibrating in
the sense it surprises
agents’ existing expectations, entrepreneurial plans, and
patterns of resource
allocation, production, and employment, it is equilibrating in that it always
reveals a new and
better allocation of
resources which better addresses scarcity.

Equilibria are upset
by entrepreneurial
innovation (1976a;
1976b), of which
technological change
is just one kind. Individuals act on private
information they interpret subjectively
(1986).

Successful entrepreneurship is equilibrating; unsuccessful
entrepreneurship is
disequilibrating. The
natural structure of
incentives ensures
that entrepreneurial
success predominates. Disequilibrium
prices are everywhere
and offer alert entrepreneurs pure profit
opportunities. Entrepreneurial exploitation of disequilibrium prices adjusts
markets toward equilibrium through arbitrage (1984a).

Entrepreneur

Entrepreneurs introduce information
asymmetries by engaging in new activities. Dispersion of
asymmetric information impairs coordination of entrepreneurial plans,
resulting in less output and less efficient
production.

Entrepreneurs contribute to evolving
market institutions
which improve consistency among
planned consumption, production, and
resource allocation
(1956). Entrepreneurs combine capital equipment in specific ways to produce
output, but can recombine it in a different manner (multiple specificity of
capital).

Entrepreneurs are
alert to opportunities
presented by market
failures and profit
from fulfilling existing wants (1973). Entrepreneurs observably fail through overoptimism (Knowledge Problem A) or
fail unobservably
through overpessimism (Knowledge Problem B).
They succeed
through alertness to
information they can
use to overcome the
knowledge problems
(1990).

inputs cannot be obtained, or output sold, at sufﬁciently low or high prices, or that
production technology, input quality, or consumer demand
= 10 =for the output are actually better than anticipated by entrepreneurial planners (Kirzner 1990:168–69).
In these instances of overpessimism (Kirzner’s Knowledge Problem B), exchanges
which are theoretically feasible, and could be seen after the fact to have been feasible, are never planned or undertaken, because market participants were unaware
of the feasibility of the potential exchanges. Entrepreneurs always seek to discover
such opportunities, but many must go undiscovered. These kinds of problems are
not self-correcting, and await entrepreneurial discovery before anyone can be aware
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Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship
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Figure 2. Entrepreneurship and Equilibria
Figure 2
Entrepreneurship and Equilibria

of them. The entrepreneur can proﬁt by uncovering, and remedying, instances of
Knowledge Problem B.
These objections based on Kirzner’s two knowledge problems can be given
an alternative formulation, drawing mainly from Hayek (1949) and Kirzner (1984a,
1984b, 1990): the information set required for optimizing behavior does not exist
in reality. In reality, each market participant possesses some relevant information,
much of which is purely subjective. Much of this information is held exclusively by
a certain individual, for example, that individual’s subjective preferences or his or
her plans for future consumption and production, which no one else can observe
before the fact. Some information, such as undiscovered technical knowledge, is
always waiting to be discovered, but until someone uncovers and acts on new information, resource allocation is always less optimal and always imposes greater
material scarcity on economic agents. Individuals also differ in their alertness,
both in terms of intensity and application (Kirzner 1979:170). Entrepreneurs overcome the social problem of information dispersal whenever they generate ﬂows
of information that stimulate revision of uncoordinated decisions toward greater
mutual coordination (Kirzner 1984a:147) moving the market toward a never-realized equilibrium state.
Prices summarize relevant information which would otherwise be useless
to market participants in satisfying their wants, but inadequacies in market prices
also create the proﬁt-and-loss incentives for entrepreneurs to adjust prices. Entrepreneurs compete in adjusting prices in a “competitive process which digs out what
is in fact discovered” (Kirzner 1984a:150). The competitive process where “competition is valuable only because, and so far as, its results are unpredictable and on
the whole different from those which anyone has, or could have, deliberately aimed
at” (Hayek 1978:180) is incompatible with central planning.
Because Austrian business cycle theory is built on the concept of production or capital structure, the role entrepreneurial managers play in adjusting and
maintaining the production structure connects Austrian macroeconomics with
Austrian microeconomics (Dulbecco and Garrouste 1999). Baetjer (1997, 2000)
notes the need to coordinate production through the capital structure is ongoing
and omnipresent due to the frequent arrival of new knowledge. Furthermore, the
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production structure is maintained through experimental revisions of entrepreneurial plans. “Constant revision is the work of experimental inquiry” (Dewey
1930:156). These adjustments are always experimental because the outcome cannot be known in advance: “The uncertainty of the future is already implied in the
very notion of action” (Mises 1949:105). Baetjer emphasizes that capital equipment
calls for complementary technical knowledge and other resources. Capital is useless if workers do not know how to use it and if complementary capital is not available, e.g., a locomotive cannot be operated by a layperson, and cannot run without
tracks.20 Maintaining the production structure is a dynamic, disequilibrium process
(Lewin 1999:22–25; Lewin and Phelan 2000:68).
Each stage of production is ﬁlled with half-baked cakes (Kirzner 1997:37–41).
Individual entrepreneurial errors are common, occurring often and randomly
(Rothbard 1997:73; Mueller 2001:13). Because the production structure cannot
constantly readjust without signiﬁcant cost, once entrepreneurs have implemented
a production plan, they may resist revising it, and may even resist alertness to new
information which calls for revising a production plan once it has been implemented
(Kirzner 1973:35, 64–68, 1992:26–28; Hannan and Freeman 1984).

Conclusion
Austrian radical subjectivism is presented as a special case of Dewey’s ways of
knowing or transactional strategy. The Austrian economists generally view the
economic knowledge of market participants as subjective, but view the scientiﬁc
knowledge of economics as asserting and aiming for ontologic certainty. Correct
scientiﬁc knowledge would thus possess an objective character. Dewey views scientiﬁc knowledge as tentative and non-ontologic. Because Menger, Mises, and Hayek
all accepted the possibility that scientiﬁc knowledge, if correct, could possess a ﬁnal,
objective, and even apodictic certainty, their view was closer to that of the logical
positivists of the Vienna circle than to Dewey’s pragmatism. In Dewey’s view, the
scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing to the scientiﬁc community,
offering more profound insight or more efﬁcacious practical applications. In spite
of diametrically opposite positions on the status of scientiﬁc knowledge, both the
radical subjectivism of the Austrian school and Dewey’s transactional philosophy
justify rejection of central economic planning. The Deweyan transactional strategy,
knowledge as ways of knowing, suggests a broader and more fundamental critique
of the socialist position in the calculation debate.
Dewey’s transactional philosophy is applied to several problems in modern
economics. The economic conception of subjectivism was explored and discussed.
Though subjective valuation is central to the economic approach to analyzing behavior, the concept is effectively limited to the social sciences. Thus, the radical
subjectivism of the Austrian school is too limited in scope to conﬂict signiﬁcantly
with Dewey’s transactional view. Dewey’s view, that subject and object are connected through transaction, transcends the narrow technical meaning of subject
and object applied in the social sciences. Spontaneous order characterizes most
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economic phenomena, and indeed, most phenomena resulting from social interaction or transaction. Spontaneously evolved institutions include government, laws,
markets, and money. Spontaneous order explains why economics can be seen as
a rigorous approach to the phenomena of subjectivity, much like statistics offers a
mathematically rigorous approach to uncertainty and indeterminacy.
Dewey’s transactional strategy was applied to clarify several problems in the
theory of entrepreneurship. Examining the meaning and signiﬁcance of hypothesized market equilibria and how entrepreneurs potentially can proﬁt from disturbing or establishing coordination among the entrepreneurial plans of individuals
offers a richer understanding of entrepreneurs’ contribution to social progress. Different and apparently conﬂicting theories of entrepreneurship were demonstrated
to be related as special and general cases.
The Deweyan transactional approach is essential for removing roadblocks to
inquiry that would otherwise frustrate the progress of the social sciences. Economics analyzes problems of social communication through spontaneously emergent
institutions. Market prices summarize the information entrepreneurial planners
can use to coordinate their future productive activity against an indeterminate
world of uncertainty. An essential part of economic analysis has to be the valid interpretation and contextualization of what economics asserts, calling for application of Dewey’s transactional strategy.

Notes
Financial support of the American Institute for Economic Research is gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks are due to Dan Palmer, Elias Khalil, Frank X. Ryan, and two anonymous referees,
who commented on earlier versions of this paper. The author remains responsible for all
shortcomings.
1. “Inquiry, through linguistic development of terms and propositions, arrives in
judgment at warranted assertions upon existence” (Dewey and Bentley 1949:165). “Final
judgment is attained through a series of partial judgments—those to which the name estimates
or appraisals has been given. Judgment is not something occurring all at once. Since it is a
manifestation of inquiry, it cannot be instantaneous and yet be inquiry. Short of attainment
of a ﬁnally resolved situation (the result of ﬁnal judgment and assertion) respective subjectand-predicate contents are provisionally instituted in distinction from and correlation with
each other. Were subject-and-predicate contents ﬁnal rather than provisional, distinction
and relation would constitute a state of irreconcilable opposition. Since they are functional
and operative, there is no more conﬂict than there is in the fact that in the course of every
complex productive activity, industrial or social, divisions of labor are instituted which
nevertheless are functionally connected with one another” (Dewey 1938b:133–134). This
argues strongly that Dewey is subjectivist in the sense of the Austrian school: “Final judgment
is individual . . .” and refers to “a situation in the sense in which the meaning of that word has
been explained; it is a qualitative existential whole which is unique” (Dewey 1938b:122).
2. Dan Palmer suggests that the more desired, hoped-for, or important a warranted
assertion that resolves a problematic situation, the more important the means employed
to arrive at it. A further consideration is that within inquiry, ends often become means to
subsequent ends. One inquirer’s end may be another’s mid-journey milestone, a possibility
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given particularly eloquent expression by Isaac Newton (1675): “If I have seen further . . . it
is by standing on the shoulders of giants.”
3. “Knowings and knowns are to be taken together as aspects of one event” (Dewey
and Bentley 1949:127). Ryan (1995:113) discusses the relationship of Dewey’s philosophy
to that of Hegel and Marx.
4. The term “reconciliation” is potentially misleading because it can be taken to imply a
prior separateness. The goal of inquiry is to clarify the way in which two sides of a functional
distinction were never apart. Thus, the problem of their reconciliation is illusory. The author
is indebted to Dan Palmer for this interpretation.
5. Concepts are not physical objects as in Platonic idealism (nor are they supernatural),
thus concepts cannot have any existence independent of the individual subjective beliefs of a
knower. Even so, from a transactional perspective, the distinctions are equally subjective and
objective, both being two phases of a single knowing transaction. Distinctions are facts in
the etymologically original sense of factum or things done, and thus possess objective reality
in this strictly limited sense, where the thing and the doing are present simultaneously. The
objectivity of one’s knowledge is limited by the sum of knowledge and belief accepted by a
particular individual. From the perspective of economics, the subjectivity of an individual’s
knowledge is fairly overriding, even when many individuals accept the same knowledge as
“truth.” To say that things distinguished are “only subjective,” as economists still speak of
human valuation, is not representative of Dewey and Bentley’s views. Dewey replaces the stage
of ontology with the stage of inquiry, not with the stage of subjectivism. In Dewey’s thought,
to reject the extreme of a traditional dualism is rarely if ever to embrace the other extreme
(here subjectivism). The point economics makes is more that the objective characteristics
of a good, service, or entrepreneurial plan are relatively unimportant (from an economic
perspective) and subordinated to individuals’ subjective valuation. Economists do not hold
that objective characteristics do not exist, or that subjective valuation, such as it exists at any
time in reality, is not an objective fact.
6. “It was assumed that . . . knowledge is dependent upon the independent existence
of a knower and of something to be known; occurring, that is, between mind and the world;
between self and not-self; or in words made familiar by use, between subject and object. The
assumption consisted in holding that the subject matters designated by these antithetical
terms are separate and independent; hence, the problem of problems was to determine some
method of harmonizing the status of one with the status of the other with respect to the
possibility and nature of knowledge” (Dewey and Bentley 1949:287–288).
7. The subjectivity of human experience is called the Rashomon effect, from Akira
Kurosawa’s (1910–1998) 1950 ﬁlm based on the short stories of Ryunosuke Akutagawa
(1892–1927).
Non-physical objects like processes, systems, entrepreneurial plans, technical knowledge,
and administrative procedures can also be valued by individuals. Dewey would point out
correctly that these are also objects (Dewey and Bentley 1949:194–196), since they can be real
without necessarily possessing corporeality. Dewey discourages use of the words “subject,”
“subjective,” and “subjectivism,” but they seem to be necessary technical terms in modern
economics. In more Deweyan language, we might say individuals (subjects) and external
reality (objects) are related through (subjective) valuation, and different individuals are
related (objectively) through exchange. See note 10 below on the Austrian school’s distinction
between objective exchange value and subjective use value. Dewey might object that these
two kinds of valuation cannot really be separated, and that the Austrian distinction is merely
a conceptual schema.
8. “The environment in which human beings live, act, and inquire, is not simply
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physical. It is cultural as well. Problems which induce inquiry grow out of the relation of
fellow beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with theses relations are not only the
eye and ear, but the meanings which have developed in the course of living, together with the
ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its constituents of tools, arts, institutions,
traditions, and customary beliefs. . . . Man, as Aristotle remarked, is a social animal. This fact
introduces him into situations and originates problems and ways of solving them that have
no precedent upon the organic biological level. For man is social in another sense than the
bee and the ant, since his activities are encompassed in an environment that is culturally
transmitted, so that what man does and how he acts, is determined not by organic structure,
and physical heredity alone but by the inﬂuence of cultural heredity, embedded in traditions,
institutions, customs, and the purposes and beliefs they both carry and inspire” (Dewey
1938a:48–49).
9. “Transaction . . . represents that late level of inquiry in which in which observation
and presentation could be carried on without attribution of the aspects and phases of action
to independent self-actors, or to independently inter-acting elements or relations” (Dewey
and Bentley 1949:136).
10. Menger (1871:118–121) and Mises (1912:38–45; 1949:120–121) distinguish
subjective use value, which is unobservable and internal to the individual, from objective
exchange value, which is both observable and external. This distinction was central to the
Austrian school, but continues to be almost universally accepted in other schools of economic
thought. See note 7 for discussion of a transactional resolution of this distinction.
11. Mises (1949:47-48; 1960:35–37, 57) regards scientiﬁc knowledge as value-free (wertfrei) because it would be true regardless of an individual’s values. This is particularly true for
economic theory which addresses the fulﬁllment of human wants or values, but not their
ultimate source or justiﬁcation. Goods can be used either to satisfy an individual’s wants
(subjective use-value) or for exchange (objective exchange-value).
12. Hayek (1952b:374) cites Marx, Engels, Feuerbach, Renan, Taine, Durkheim, Mazzini,
Croce, Proudhon, and Pareto along with Dewey as accepting a social theory of Comte and
Hegel that our material understanding of scientiﬁc technology governs and limits our
development in all other ﬁelds.
13. “The transactional is in fact that point of view which systematically proceeds upon
the ground that knowing is co-operative and as such is integral with communication”
(Dewey and Bentley 1949:97). “No scientiﬁc inquirer can keep what he ﬁnds to himself or
turn it to merely private account without losing his scientiﬁc standing. Everything discovered
belongs to the community of workers. Every new idea and theory has to be submitted to this
community for conﬁrmation and test” (Dewey 1930:154).
14. In physics, Newtonian mechanics was superseded by Einsteinian relativity. Although
Newtonian mechanics remains as true as it ever was in its limited context, and being a special
case, is nested within Einsteinian physics, we often say that the truth of Einsteinian physics
demonstrates the falsity of Newtonian physics. It remains impossible for us to know if
Einsteinian relativity will ever be superseded—we cannot know that it is not ontologically
ﬁnal truth, and we cannot know that it is.
Similarly, the familiar Euclidian geometry of everyday experience is nested within
several alternative non-Euclidian geometries of Gauss (1777–1855), Lobachevskii (1792–
1856), Bólyai (1802–1850), Riemann (1826–1866), and the projective geometry of Cayley
(1821–1895) and Kline (1849–1925). The non-Euclidian geometries are not nested within
one another, and some are mutually exclusive. Euclidean geometry is nested within each
as a special case, and each of the non-Euclidean geometries are nested within Kline’s more
general system (Gellert et al. 1975:712–717).
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Section 4 shows how Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship is nested within
Lachmann’s more general theory, which is nested in turn within Kirzner’s (Figure 2).
15. Human choice and preference have to be viewed as objective in the sense “that
man and his doings and transactions have to be viewed as facts within the natural cosmos”
(Dewey and Bentley 1949:116). When economists say human preference is subjective, they
merely mean that each person’s value scale is unique to the individual. Even if, by chance,
two individuals shared identical preferences, economists would appeal to the inherent
separateness of the two individuals, an objective property, to demonstrate the difference of
their preferences. In economics, Jack’s and Jill’s preferences are different, even when they have
the same content, because they belong to two different individuals.
Barnett (2003) gives a comprehensive critique of preference-additivity. A modern area
of research in consumer theory involves using the utility of others as an argument in utility
functions (Postlewaite 1998; Bergstrom 1999). This formulation potentially breaks down the
presumed separateness of individual utilities, but not their inherently subjective character.
Utility independence was traditionally assumed for analytical tractability.
16. Dewey was unfortunately ambiguous regarding the permissibility of coercion.
“Whether the use of force is justiﬁed or not . . . is, in substance, a question of efﬁciency
(including economy) of means in the accomplishment of ends” (Dewey 1916:362, cited by
Hayek 1973:160, note 4). Dewey’s position contrasts sharply with Mises’s characterization
of the social sciences as value-free (wertfrei); to Mises and Hayek, force could never be
initiated, but could only be applied as a defensive response to the force of others. See also
Hayek (1960:17; 1976:44). Dewey (1935:41; 1938a:74) even suggests that liberty is liberty to
exercise force over others.
17. Schumpeter is not always considered a member of the Austrian school, however,
his theory of the entrepreneur was highly inﬂuential and controversial among both Austrian
and mainstream economists. For a good part of Schumpeter’s career, roughly c. 1900–1940,
the Austrian school was the mainstream.
18. General equilibrium is a hypothetical macroeconomic condition in which all
markets for goods and services are simultaneously in equilibrium. Among the functions
entrepreneurs fulﬁll in market economies, they experiment with different prices and are alert
to the shortages and surpluses which follow. Shortages and surpluses offer alert entrepreneurs
valuable information for the next round of experimental price-setting.
19. On this important distinction between Kirzner and Lachmann, see especially Lewin
(1999:22–25).
20. Lachmann (1947/1977:199), Lewin (1999:123–125), and Cochran (2001:22) make
a similar point.
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